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ABSTRACT
Fair allocation has been studied intensively in both economics and
computer science, and fair sharing of resources has aroused re-
newed interest with the advent of virtualization and cloud comput-
ing. Prior work has typically focused on mechanisms for fair shar-
ing of a single resource. We provide a new definition for the simul-
taneous fair allocation of multiple continuously-divisible resources.
Roughly speaking, we define fairness as the situation where every
user either gets all the resources he wishes for, or else gets at least
his entitlement on some bottleneck resource, and therefore cannot
complain about not getting more. This definition has the same de-
sirable properties as the recently suggested dominant resource fair-
ness, and also handles the case of multiple bottlenecks. We then
prove that a fair allocation according to this definition is guaran-
teed to exist for any combination of user requests and entitlements
(where a user’s relative use of the different resources is fixed). The
proof, which uses tools from the theory of ordinary differential
equations, is constructive and provides a method to compute the
allocations numerically.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.1 [OPERATING SYSTEMS]: Process Management—Schedul-
ing; K.6.2 [MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTING AND INFOR-
MATION SYSTEMS]: Installation Management—Pricing and re-
source allocation
General Terms
Management, performance
Keywords
Resource allocation, fair share, bottlenecks
1. INTRODUCTION
Fair allocation is a problem that has been widely studied both in
economics and computer science. In economics, a wide range of is-
sues have been studied, ranging from the design of voting rules and
∗Much of this work was done while the author was on sabbatical
leave at Hebrew University.
the apportionment of representation in Congress to the allocation
of joint costs and fair cake cutting to envy-free auctions. (See [7,
17, 36] for a sample of the wide-ranging work in the area.) In com-
puter science, besides the work on economics-related issues, fair
allocation has been the focus of a great deal of attention in operat-
ing systems, where fair-share scheduling is a major concern. (See
the related work in Section 2.)
But what exactly does fair allocation mean? Generally speaking,
the notion of fairness may pertain to mechanisms like bargaining
and their relationship to ethical issues (e.g. [35]). We focus on a
more technical level, and take “fair allocation” to mean “an alloca-
tion according to agreed entitlements”. The source of the entitle-
ments is immaterial; for example, they could result from unequal
contributions towards the procurement of some shared computa-
tional infrastructure, or from the dictates of different service-level
agreements. Still, what does it mean to say that a user is “entitled
to 20% of the system”? Is this a guarantee for 20% of the CPU cy-
cles? Or maybe 20% of each and every resource? And what should
we do if the user requires, say, only 3% of the CPU, but over 70%
of the network bandwidth? Reserving 20% of the CPU for it will
cause obvious waste, while curbing its network usage might also
be ill-advised if no other user can take up the slack.
Our goal in this paper is to define a notion of fair allocation when
multiple, continuously-divisible resources need to be allocated, and
show that a fair allocation according to our definition is guaranteed
to exist. Our motivation comes from work in operating systems, so
many of our examples and much of the discussion below is taken
primarily from that literature. But, as should be clear, our approach
is meaningful whenever a number of users need to share a number
of different resources, each has a certain pre-negotiated entitlement
to a share of the resources, but each has different needs for each of
the resources.
The common approach to resource management in both operating
systems and virtual machine monitors (VMMs) is to focus on the
CPU. Scheduling and allocation are done on the CPU, and this in-
duces a use of other devices such as the network or disk. However,
the relative use of diverse devices by different processes may be
quite dissimilar. For example, by trying to promote an I/O-bound
process (because it deserves more of the CPU than it is using), we
might turn the disk into a bottleneck, and inadvertently allow the
internal scheduling of the disk controller to dictate the use of the
whole system. Thus the CPU-centric view may be inappropriate
when the goal is to achieve a predefined allocation of the resources.
In order to avoid such problems, it has recently been suggested that
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fair-share scheduling be done in two steps [14]: first, identify the
resource that is the system bottleneck, and then enforce the desired
relative allocations on this resource. The fair usage of the bottle-
neck resource induces some level of usage of other resources as
well, but this need not be controlled, because there is sufficient ca-
pacity on those resources for all contending processes.
The question is what to do if two or more resources become bottle-
necks. This may easily happen when different processes predom-
inantly use distinct resources. For example, consider a situation
where one process makes heavy use of the CPU, a second is I/O-
bound, while a third process uses both CPU and I/O, making both
bottlenecks. We consider such situations and make the following
contributions.
We propose a definition of what it means to be fair that is appropri-
ate even when different users or processes have different require-
ments for various resources. The definition, presented in Section 3,
extends the idea of focusing on the bottleneck; it essentially states
that we are fair as long as each and every user receives his enti-
tlement on at least one bottleneck resource. This is claimed to be
fair because, given an assumption that each user uses the differ-
ent resources in predefined proportions, the definition implies that
users cannot justifiably complain about not getting more. We then
prove in Section 5 that an allocation that satisfies our fairness defi-
nition is guaranteed to exist. The proof is constructive and provides
a method to compute the allocation numerically. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the proof makes use of tools from the theory of ordinary dif-
ferential equations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that such tools have been used to answer questions of this type.
While there has been extensive work on fair allocation of resources
over the years, there seems to be very little work that like us tackles
the fair allocation of multiple resources of distinct types. A very
recently suggested approach to this problem is dominant resource
fairness, where allocations are set so as to equalize each user’s max-
imal allocation of any resource [16]. We discuss the similarities and
differences between this scheme and ours in Section 4.
2. PRIOR WORK
To put our contributions in context, we first review prior work in
fair allocation of resources in systems. The issue of resource allo-
cation has been studied for many years, but mostly from different
perspectives than the one we use.
The requirement for control over the allocation of resources given
to different users or groups of users has been addressed in several
contexts. It is usually called fair-share scheduling in the literature,
where “fair” is understood as according to each user’s entitlement,
rather than as equitable. Early implementations were based on ac-
counting, and simply gave priority to users who had not yet re-
ceived their due share at the expense of those that had exceeded
their share [21, 22]. In Unix systems, one approach that has been
suggested [13, 20] is to manipulate each process’s “nice” value to
achieve the desired effect.1 Simpler and more direct approaches
include lottery scheduling [34] or using an economic model [33],
where each process’s priority (and hence relative share of the re-
source) is expressed by its share of lottery tickets or capital.
Another popular approach is based on virtual time [12, 27]. The
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“Nice” is a user-controlled input to the system’s priority calcula-
tions. It is so called because normal users may only reduce their
priority, and be nice to others.
idea is that time is simply counted at a different rate for different
processes, based on their relative allocations. In particular, schedul-
ing decisions may be based on the difference between the resources
a process has actually received and what it would have received if
the ideal processor sharing discipline had been used [5, 8, 15]. This
difference has also been proposed as a way to measure (un)fairness
that combines job seniority considerations with resource require-
ments considerations [2, 30].
In networking research, control over relative allocations is achieved
using leaky bucket or token bucket metering approaches. This is
combined with fair queueing, in which requests from different users
are placed in distinct queues, which are served according to how
much bandwidth they should receive [10, 26]. The most common
approach to fairness is max-min fairness, where the goal is to max-
imize the minimal allocation to any user [29].
Focusing on virtual machine monitors, Xen uses a credit sched-
uler essentially based on virtual time, where credits correspond to
milliseconds and domains that have extra credit are preferred over
those that have exhausted their credit [28]. Note, however, that
domains that have gone over their credit limit may still run, as in
borrowed virtual time [12]. VMware ESX server uses weighted fair
queueing or lottery scheduling [10, 34]. The Virtuoso system uses
a scheduler called VSched that treats virtual machines as real-time
tasks that require a certain slice of CPU time per each period of
real time [24, 25]. Controlling the slices and periods allows for ad-
equate performance even when mixing interactive and batch jobs.
The main drawback of the approaches mentioned above is that they
focus on one resource — the CPU, or in a networking context, the
bandwidth of a link. The effect of CPU scheduling on I/O is dis-
cussed by Ongaro et al. [28] and Govindan et al. [18]. For ex-
ample, they suggested that VMs that do I/O could be temporar-
ily given a higher priority so as not to cause delays and latency
problems. However, the interaction of such prioritization with al-
locations was not considered. Similarly, there has been interesting
work on scheduling bottleneck devices other than the CPU [4, 19,
32], but this was done to optimize performance of the said device,
and not to enforce a desired allocation.
Few works have considered dealing with multiple resource con-
straints. Diao et al. [11] suggested an approach of controlling ap-
plications so that they adjust their usage, rather than to enforce an
allocation. Fairness in the allocation of multiple resources was ad-
dressed by Sabrina et al. [31] in the context of packet schedul-
ing, where the resources were network bandwidth and the CPU
resources needed to process packets. The approach taken was to
consider the processing and transmission times together when us-
ing a weighted fair queueing framework. The interaction between
scheduling and multiple resources was discussed by Amir et al. [1].
However, the context is completely different as they consider tar-
gets for migration in the interest of load balancing. Interestingly,
the end result is similar to our approach, as they try to avoid ma-
chines where any one of the resources will end up being highly
utilized and in danger of running out (and becoming a bottleneck).
Control over multiple resources was also considered at the microar-
chitectural level by Bitirgen et al. [6], but with a goal of achieving
performance goals rather than predefined allocations.
Our work extends a recent suggestion to focus on bottleneck re-
sources [5, 14]. Specifically, the suggestion was to identify at
each stage which device is the system bottleneck (that is, the de-
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vice whose usage is closest to 100% utilization) and then enforce
the desired allocation on this device. For example, if the disk is
the bottleneck, one can promote or delay requests from different
users so as to achieve the desired relative allocation of bandwidth
among them. This, in turn, induces corresponding usage patterns
on other devices including the CPU. But if the disk is the bottle-
neck, the other devices will be less than 100% utilized, and there-
fore scheduling them is less important. However, this suggestion
does not deal with what to do if there are in fact multiple bottle-
necks, which, as we observed, can easily happen. Our work extends
the definition to cover the case of multiple bottlenecks.
In networking, allocations to flows traversing multiple links are
also typically viewed as using multiple resources, where again the
constraints stem from links that become saturated (and hence a bot-
tleneck). In this context min-max fairness can be characterized
based on a geometrical representation that is very similar to ours
[29]. However, the requirements from all the resources (links) are
equal, making the search for a solution easier. Specifically, it is of-
ten possible to move in a straight line from the origin to the bound-
ary, in a direction based on the desired relative allocations, rather
than using a more complicated trajectory as we do in Section 5.4.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other work to suggest and
analyze a fair-share allocation policy that handles diverse require-
ments for multiple resources is the recently proposed dominant re-
source fairness [16]. This does not explicitly consider bottlenecks,
but rather focuses on each user’s maximal usage of any single re-
source. We describe this in more detail and compare it with our
definition in Section 4.
3. SHARING MULTIPLE RESOURCES
Fair sharing of resources has been one of the objectives of schedul-
ing for many years, and has received renewed interest in the con-
texts of virtualization and cloud computing. But what exactly is
“fair sharing”? Consider a setting with N users and m resources
(CPU, network bandwidth, disk usage, and so on). We assume that
each user i is entitled to a fixed percentage ei of the full capacity,
and hence of each resource, where e1 + · · · + eN = 1. Each user
i requests a fraction rij of resource j. If rij < ei for all j—that
is, if i requests less than his entitlement on each resource—then
any reasonable notion of fair sharing should grant user i all that he
requests on each resource.
But what if user i requests more than his entitlement on some re-
source j? In this case, if r1j + · · ·+ rNj ≤ 1 for each resource j,
so that no resource is a bottleneck, then any efficient notion of fair
sharing should give each user all that he requests. Even if a user
requests more than he is entitled to of some resource, as long as no
resource is a bottleneck, there is no problem. Clearly the problem
arises only when r1j + · · · + rNj > 1 for some resource j. If
there is only one bottleneck resource, again it seems easy enough
to cut back those users who are requesting more than their entitle-
ment [14]. But what if there are several bottlenecks? What should
“fair allocation” mean in this case?
The problem is compounded by the fact that different users have
different requirements rij for the different resources. For exam-
ple, in an operating system setting, if a certain process is entitled to
50% of the resources, but this is an I/O-bound process that hardly
uses the CPU, the scheduler cannot force it to use more and fill its
allocation. Moreover, reserving 50% of the CPU for this process
will likely just waste most of this capacity. However, if we allocate
the unused capacity to another process, which also turns out to be
I/O-bound, we may end up hurting the performance of the original
process. We therefore need to find a set of allocations that allow us
to exploit complementary usage profiles to achieve high utilization,
but at the same time respect the different entitlements. By respect-
ing the entitlements, the allocations can be claimed to be fair. In
particular, we define fairness by invoking the user’s point of view
of the entitlements:
FAIRNESS DEFINITION
An allocation of multiple resources is fair if users have no justi-
fication to complain that they got less than they deserve.
A key contribution of this paper is to define the properties of an al-
location that satisfies this definition, i.e. one where any complaints
would be unjustified. We then go on to prove that such an alloca-
tion is in fact achievable, for any combination of requirements and
entitlements. The discussion above already illustrates the core of
our approach: a focus on bottleneck resources. This approach is
in line with basic results in performance evaluation, as it is well
known that the bottleneck device constrains system performance
(this is, after all, the definition of a bottleneck) [23]. An important
manifestation of this result is that, in a queueing network, most of
the clients will always be concentrated in the queue of the bottle-
neck device. This implies that scheduling the bottleneck device is
the only important activity, and moreover, that judicious scheduling
can be used to control relative resource allocations.
Precisely this reasoning led to the recent suggestion that propor-
tional resource allocation be exercised on the bottleneck device at
each instant, rather than on the same device (e.g. the CPU) at all
times [5, 14]. Focusing on the bottleneck in this way avoids try-
ing to control allocations based on an irrelevant tuning knob, and
provides the most reasonable interpretation of enforcing resource
allocations in a multi-resource environment.
But what happens if there are two or more bottlenecks? In order
to derive the allocations, we first need to define a model of how
resources are used. Given the definitions of entitlements and re-
quirements above, our task is to figure out how much to cut each
user back. We assume that we cut each user back by the same factor
xi on each resource. This is in fact our main assumption:
PROPORTIONAL RESOURCE USAGE ASSUMPTION
Users use diverse resources in well-defined proportions. Thus
cutting back on one resource by a certain factor will lead to
reduced usage of other resources by the same factor.
This assumption reflects a model where each user is engaged in
a specific type of activity with a well-defined resource usage pro-
file. For example, a user may be serving requests from clients over
the Internet. Each request requires a certain amount of computa-
tion, a certain amount of network activity, and a certain amount of
disk activity. If the rate of requests grows, all of these grow by the
same factor. But if one resource is constrained, limiting the rate of
serving requests, this induces a similar reduction in the usage of all
other resources (see demonstration in Fig. 1). This is essentially the
“knee model” of Etsion et al. [15], where I/O activity is shown to
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Figure 1: Illustration of a resource request profile, and how it is
cut back when usage of resource 4 is limited to 50%.
be linearly proportional to CPU allocation up to some maximal us-
age level. It also corresponds to the task model of Ghodsi et al. [16]
when all tasks that a user wants to execute have identical resource
requirements (which is indeed the specific model they use in their
proofs). Note, however, that this is indeed a limiting assumption.
Specifically, it excludes usage patterns where one resource is used
to compensate for lack of another resource, as happens, for exam-
ple, in paging, or when using compression to reduce bandwidth.
All the above leads to the following problem definition. We want
to find x1, . . . , xN , such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, where for each user
i, xi is the fraction of that user’s request which will be granted.
Furthermore, we require that
for each resource j : x1r1j + · · ·+ xNrNj ≤ 1. (1)
This means that the total usage of each resource is limited by the
resource capacity. Those resources for which equality holds are the
bottleneck resources.
Among all the allocations x1, . . . , xN that satisfy Eq. (1), which
should qualify as “fair”? This is where we define the “no justified
complaints” condition:
NO JUSTIFIED COMPLAINTS CONDITION
A user cannot justify complaining about his allocation if either
he gets all he asked for, or else he gets his entitlement, and giv-
ing him more would come at the expense of other users who
have their own entitlements.
Using the notation above, the “no justified complaints” condition
can be formally expressed as:
for all users i : xi = 1 or
there exists a bottleneck resource j∗ such that xirij∗ ≥ ei.
(2)
Specifically, user i cannot complain if there exists some bottleneck
resource j∗ where he gets at least what he is entitled to. Since
j∗ is already utilized to its full capacity, giving him more, that is,
increasing xi, would necessarily come at the expense of other users,
who have the right to their own entitlements. Therefore, increasing
i’s allocation at their expense would be unfair.
Note that it may happen that a user receives less than his entitlement
on other resources, including other bottleneck resources, where the
entitlement would seem to indicate that a larger allocation is man-
dated. This is where the proportional resource usage assumption
comes in. Recall that the factor xi is common to all resources.
Thus giving a user a higher allocation on any resource implies that
his allocation must grow on all resources. The original bottleneck
resource j∗ thus constrains all allocations, even on other bottleneck
resources or resources that are not themselves contended.
Being based on bottlenecks, it is easy to see that allocations that
satisfy Eqs. (1) and (2) are Pareto optimal (but, of course, not every
Pareto-optimal solution satisfies our fairness criterion). Showing
that such a fair allocation exists turns out to be surprisingly nontriv-
ial. The obvious greedy approach does not seem to work. Given a
collection of requests and entitlements, suppose that we try to sat-
isfy the users one at a time, so that, after the kth step, we have
an allocation (x1, . . . , xN) satisfying Eq. (1) such that the first k
users have no complaints (that is, Eq. (2) holds for users 1, . . . , k).
To see why doing this does not seem helpful, suppose that there
are three resources and three users. User 1 requests ( 1
2
, 1
2
, 2
3
) (i.e.,
r11 =
1
2
, r12 =
1
2
, and r13 = 23 ) and is entitled to 0.5 of the re-
sources (i.e., e1 = 12 ). User 2 requests ( 12 , 58 , 12 ) and e2 = 38 , and
User 3 requests (1, 1, 1
3
) with e3 = 18 . We start by giving user 1
everything he asks for, and users 2 and 3 nothing; that is, we con-
sider the allocation x = (1, 0, 0). Clearly at this point User 1 has
no complaints. Next we try to satisfy User 2. If we do not cut back
User 1, then we must have x2 ≤ 23 , since resource 3 then becomes
a bottleneck. But with the allocation x = (1, 2
3
, 0) User 2 has a
justified complaint: the only resource on which he gets at least his
entitlement is resource 2, but resource 2 is not a bottleneck with
this allocation. So User 2 feels that he is entitled to a bigger share
of the resources. There are various ways to solve this problem. For
example, we could consider the allocation ( 3
4
, 1, 0). It is easy to
check that neither User 1 nor User 2 has a justified complaint with
this allocation. But now we need to add User 3 to the mix. To do
so, we have to cut back either User 1 or User 2, or both. It follows
from our main theorem that this can be done in a way that none of
the users has a justified complaint. But the naive greedy construc-
tion does not work; at each stage, we seem to have to completely
redo the previous assignment. Although a more clever greedy ap-
proach might work, we suspect not; a more global approach seems
necessary. We will describe such an approach in Section 5.
4. PROPERTIES OF ALLOCATIONS WITH
NO JUSTIFIED COMPLAINTS
In their analysis of dominant resource fairness, Ghodsi et al. [16]
show that it possesses four desirable attributes, under the assump-
tion that all tasks that a user wants to execute have identical re-
source requirements (in which case their model reduces to ours).
We now show that our definition possesses them as well. This an-
swers Ghodsi et al.’s question of whether there are other fair allo-
cation schemes with these properties.
The first attribute is providing an incentive for sharing: the allo-
cation given to each user should be better than just giving him his
entitlement of each resource (actually they defined this requirement
only in the case that all users are viewed as having equal entitle-
ments, in which case this amounts to giving each user 1
n
th of each
resource). Suppose that if user gets a fraction ei of each resource,
he can perform a fraction x of his requests, where xrij ≤ ei. In an
allocation that is far in our sense, user i gets to perform a fraction
y of his reuqests, where yrij = ei for some resource j. Thus, we
must have x ≤ y, which means that player i is at least as well off
participating in the scheme as he would be if he got his entitlement
on each resource.
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The second attribute is being strategyproof. This means that users
won’t benefit from lying about their resource needs. Asking for less
than the real requirements obviously just caps the user’s potential
allocation at lower levels. Asking for more with the same profile
(that is, same relative usage of different resources) does not have an
effect, except that the user might be allocated more than he can use.
While this may lead to waste, it does not provide any benefit to the
user. Modifying the profile will either give the user extra capacity
he can’t use on some resource, or worse, reduce the effective al-
location because some unneeded resource was inflated and tricked
the system into thinking it has satisfied the user’s entitlement. Thus
lying cannot lead to benefits, but can in fact cause harm to a user’s
allocation.
The third attribute is that the produced allocation be envy free: no
user should prefer another user’s allocation. This follows from be-
ing strategy proof; otherwise a user could lie about his requirements
so as to mimic those of the other user.
The fourth and final attribute is Pareto efficiency. This means that
increasing the allocation to one user must come at the expense of
another. As noted above, this follows from doing allocations based
on bottlenecks.
We now turn to comparing our definition of fairness with dominant
resource fairness. While similar in spirit, the two definitions are
actually quite different in their philosophy. At a very basic level, the
notion of fairness depends on perception of utility. In the context
of allocating resources on computer systems, the utility is typically
unknown. Consequently the notion of fairness is ill-defined.
To better understand the difference between utility and allocation,
we recount an example used by Yaari and Bar-Hillel [35]. Jones
and Smith are to share a certain number of grapefruit and avocados
to obtain certain vitamins they need. They have different physio-
logical abilities to extract these vitamins from the different fruit.
The overwhelming majority of those polled agreed that the most
fair division is one that gives them equal shares of extracted vita-
mins, despite being quite far from being equal shares of actual fruit.
But such considerations would be impossible if you do not know
their specific ability to extract vitamins, and that they actually only
eat fruit for their vitamins.
When allocating resources to virtual machines or users of a cloud
system, we do not know the real utility of these resources for the
users. We are therefore forced to just count the amount of resources
being allocated. The difference between definitions of fairness is in
how this counting is done. In asset fairness, the fractions of all re-
sources used are summed up. Thus if a user gets 20% of the CPU,
7% of the disk bandwidth, and 37% of the network bandwidth, he
is considered as having received 64/300 of the total resources in
the system. In order to be fair, other users should also get simi-
lar total fractions. In dominant resource fairness, only the largest
fraction is considered. Thus, in the example above, the user’s dom-
inant resource is the network, and he is considered to have received
resources at a level of 37/100. To be fair, other users should re-
ceive similar levels of their respective dominant resources. In our
definition of fairness, we do not focus on the dominant resource
of each user, but rather take a system-wide view based on bottle-
necks. Thus, if the CPU happens to be the only bottleneck, we say
that this user received resources at a level of 20/100. The fact that
he received more of another resource, namely the network, is im-
material, because there is no contention for the network. A user
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Figure 2: Example of the effect of imposing equal shares of a bot-
tleneck resource, compared with dominant resource fairness.
is welcome to use as much of any resource for which there is no
contention as he likes.
Interestingly, Ghodsi et al. prove that under dominant resource fair-
ness each user will be constrained by some resource that is a bot-
tleneck [16]. However, their fairness criterion does not depend
on this bottleneck, while ours does. The following example may
help to illustrate the differences (Fig. 2). Consider a scenario with
three users and two resources. The requirements of the users are
r1 = (1, 0.2), r2 = (1, 0.2), and r3 = (0.4, 0.8). The entitle-
ments are e1 = e2 = e3 = 13 . Obviously resource 1 is a bot-
tleneck, so the allocations with our definition of fairness will be
a1 = (
1
3
, 2
30
), a2 = (
1
3
, 2
30
), and a3 = ( 13 ,
2
3
). This is fair on the
bottleneck resource, and each user receives his entitlement. Domi-
nant resource fairness, in contrast, leads to the following allocation:
a1 = (0.4, 0.08), a2 = (0.4, 0.08), and a3 = (0.2, 0.4). User 3’s
usage of resource 2 is counted, despite the fact that there is no con-
tention for resource 2; this leads to a reduced allocation of resource
1. There seems to be no criteria by which to say that one allocation
is fairer than the other. It may well be that user 3 derives much
benefit from using resource 2, and therefore cutting him back on
resource 1 is perfectly justified. But given that we do not know that
this is the case, we suggest that it is safer to focus on the bottleneck
resources.
In fact, Ghodsi et al. do mention bottleneck fairness in their de-
scription of dominant resource fairness, but only as a secondary
criterion. They define bottleneck fairness only when all users have
the same dominant resource, essentially reducing the scope to the
single bottleneck case. Our work is the first to extend this with
a meaningful definition of fairness for multiple bottlenecks, and
when the dominant resources are different.
We now turn to a few more observations of the relationship be-
tween our definition and dominant resource fairness. First, we ob-
serve that if all users have the same dominant resource, dominant
resource fairness and our definition are equivalent. This follows
since the common dominant resource is the only bottleneck.
Another interesting question is one of utilization. In the example
given above, our definition of fairness led to higher overall utiliza-
tion than dominant resource fairness. It this guaranteed to always
be the case? The answer is no, as the following counter-example
demonstrates. Assume two users and four resources, with require-
ment vectors of r1 = ( 12 , 0, 0, 1) and r2 = (1, 1, 1, 0) and equal
entitlements e1 = e2 = 12 . With our no justified complaints defi-
nition, the first and last resources are the bottlenecks, and the allo-
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cations are a1 = ( 12 , 0, 0, 1) and a2 = (
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
, 0). If there were
many more “middle” resources, the average utilization would tend
to 1
2
. With the dominant resource fairness scheme, the allocations
are a1 = (
1
3
, 0, 0, 2
3
) and a2 = ( 23 ,
2
3
, 2
3
, 0). In this case, the aver-
age utilization tends to 2
3
.
Another important difference between the two definitions is that
dominant resource fairness allocations can be found using an in-
cremental algorithm [16]. Finding allocations based on the no jus-
tified complaints idea is harder, because we do not know in ad-
vance which resources will be the bottlenecks. Nevertheless, the
proof presented in the next section shows that such an allocation
always exists. Moreover, the trajectory argument used is actually
somewhat similar to how allocations are constructed for dominant
resource fairness.
5. EXISTENCE OF A FAIR ALLOCATION
In this section, we prove that an allocation satisfying (1) and (2)
always exists. Note, however, that there is an additional require-
ment that xi ≤ 1, and that (2) makes a distinction between the case
xi < 1 (need to exceed entitlement on some bottleneck resource)
and the case xi = 1 (get all you want). We can treat these two
cases uniformly by defining N dummy resources that are each re-
quested by only one user. Using m′ to denote the number of real
resources, we define the requirements on the dummy resources to
be ri,m′+i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , N , and ri,j = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ,
j = m′+1, . . . ,m′+N , and j 6= m′+i. These dummy resources
can only become a “bottleneck” if their corresponding xi = 1,
meaning that the user gets all he requested. In the following, m
will denote the full set of resources including the dummy ones.
With this addition, we want to prove the following:
Theorem 1. Given
• entitlements e1, . . . , eN such that e1 + · · · + eN = 1 and
ei ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , and
• resource requirements rij , i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . ,m such
that r1j + · · ·+ rNj ≥ 1 for j = 1, . . . ,m and 0 ≤ rij ≤ 1
for i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . ,m,
there exists an allocation x1, . . . , xN , where 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for i =
1, . . . , N , that satisfies the two conditions
(1) for all resources j, j = 1, . . . ,m, x1r1j + · · ·+xNrNj ≤ 1;
(2) for all users i, i = 1, . . . , N , there exists a resource j∗ such
that xirij∗ ≥ ei and x1r1j∗ + · · ·+ xNrNj∗ = 1.
As the mathematical derivation is somewhat involved, we first pro-
vide an argument for the special case N = 2 (two users); this
enables us to draw the constructions used in 2D. The full proof for
all values of N is given in Section 5.4.
5.1 Simplifying Assumptions
Before proving the theorem, we make three simplifying assump-
tions, all without loss of generality. First, as reflected in the defini-
tion of the resource requirements, we assume that, for each resource
j, r1,j + · · ·+ rNj ≥ 1. If there is any additional resource j⋄ for
which this inequality does not hold, we can ignore resource j⋄, and
solve the problem for the remaining resources. Whatever solution
we come up with will also be a solution when we add j⋄ back to the
picture, because its usage will be at most r1,j⋄ + · · ·+ rNj⋄ < 1.
Second, we assume that, for each user i, there is at least one re-
source j such that rij ≥ ei. (This pertains to only real resources,
not the dummy resources.) If this is not the case, we give user i
everything he asked for, remove his requests, renormalize the en-
titlements of the remaining users so that they still sum to 1, renor-
malize the remaining capacity of the different resources so that it
is still 1, and renormalize the remaining requests by the same fac-
tors. For example, suppose that users 1, 2, and 3 are entitled to 0.5,
0.2, and 0.3 of capacity, respectively. If User 1 never asks for more
than 0.5 of any resource, then we give him what he asks for, and
remove his requests from the picture. Note that this means that, for
each resource r, the fraction of r available is at least as much as the
entitlement of each user. We then multiply User 2 and User 3’s en-
titlements by 2 (= 1/(1− 0.5)), so that their entitlements still sum
to 1. After this normalization, they are entitled to 0.4 and 0.6 of
what remains after we have granted User 1’s request. Moreover, if
User 1 requested, say, 0.4 of Resource 1, so that 60% of Resource 1
is still available, we multiply each of the remaining user’s requests
by 5
3
(= 1/0.6). Again, if we solve the resulting problem, we will
have solved our original problem. This follows in general since, if
User 1 is the one eliminated, the entitlements of the remaining users
effectively grew by a factor of 1/(1 − e1), while the requests and
capacity of resource j grew by 1/(1 − r1j). Since r1j < e1 the
entitlements grew by a larger factor, and fulfilling them will also
satisfy the original entitlements.
Finally, we assume that there are no dominated inequalities, where
an inequality x1r1j + · · · + xNrNj ≤ 1 is dominated if any so-
lution (x1, . . . , xN) to the remaining inequalities is also a solution
to this inequality. Dominated inequalities can be efficiently found
by standard linear programming methods. We can clearly remove
dominated inequalities to get a system with no dominated inequal-
ities. Depending on the order of removal, we may end up with
different systems. However, a solution to any of the undominated
systems is also a solution to the original system.
We now prove that we can find a solution x1 . . . xN satisfying the
requirements of Theorem 1 under these simplifying assumptions.
We stress that this is without loss of generality; as shown above, if
we can find a solution under the simplifying assumptions, we can
also find one without these assumptions.
5.2 Proof Structure
We first establish some notation. By (1), the set of legal allocations
is a subset D of RN , where
D = { (x1, . . . , xN) : 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i and
x1r1j + · · ·+ xNrNj ≤ 1, ∀j }.
For N = 2, this is a polygon in the first quadrant, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In the figure, two users contend for three resources (m =
3). The request vectors are r1 = ( 14 , 23 , 1) and r2 = (1, 23 , 0).
This leads to the bounds shown; for example, the point ( 2
3
, 11
12
) is
impossible because it would imply using 2
3
· 1
4
+ 11
12
· 1 = 13
12
of
resource 1, i.e. more than its capacity. In the general case, this
region is a simplex in the positive orthant (that is, the convex hull
of N affinely independent points, all in (R+)N ).
For every vector x = (x1, . . . , xN) in D, the set of bottleneck
resources is
J(x) = {j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m, x1r1j + · · ·+ xNrNj = 1}.
J(x) is empty for all x in the interior of the domain D, implying
that our solution will lie on the boundary of D. Using this notation
to re-write requirement (2), our goal is to prove that there exists an
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Figure 3: Depiction of bounds on xi values due to capacity con-
straints of resources, for N = 2 and m = 3.
allocation x = (x1, . . . , xN ), such that
for every i = 1, . . . , N
there exists a j ∈ J(x) such that xirij ≥ ei. (3)
The difficulty in finding x stems exactly from this condition. In
fact, if we knew what the bottleneck resources would be, the prob-
lem could be solved efficiently using well-known machinery. Specif-
ically, fix an arbitrary subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, and consider the fol-
lowing decision problem: Is there an x ∈ D for which J(x) = I
such that condition (3) holds? It can easily be verified that this is
asking whether a finite set of linear equations and linear inequalities
is consistent. This task is subsumed by the Linear Programming
problem, and can thus be solved in polynomial time.
How can we overcome the difficulty involved in satisfying condi-
tion (3) without knowing in advance what the set J(x) is? We take
a somewhat unconventional approach to this problem. The set D
is a polytope, that is, a bounded convex subset of RN that is de-
fined by a finite list of linear inequalities. We want to approximate
D by a subset Q ⊆ D that is convex and has a smooth boundary.
Intuitively, Q “rounds off” the corners of D (see below for further
discussion). Such a set Q is defined by infinitely many linear in-
equalities: For every hyperplane H that is tangent to Q we write a
linear inequality that states that xmust reside “below” H . It would
seem that this only complicates matters, replacing the finitely de-
fined D by Q. However, the problematic condition (3) takes on a
much nicer form when applied to Q, and becomes a very simple
relation involving the contact point of H and Q, the normal to H ,
and the vector e (see Equation (7) below). Moreover, using stan-
dard tools from the theory of ordinary differential equations, we
can find a point on the boundary of Q where this relation holds.
To find the solution, we do not consider a single smooth Q, but
rather a whole parametric familyQt. This family has the properties
that (a) the sets Qt grow as the parameter t increases; (b) they are
all contained in D; and (c) as t → ∞ the sets Qt converge to D.
For every t > 0, we find a point x(t) on the boundary of Qt such
that x(t) satisfies the analogue of condition (3). As t → ∞ the
points x(t) tend to the boundary of D. We argue that there always
exists a convergent subsequence of the points x(t), and show that
the limit point of this subsequence solves our original problem. In
the language of the description below, Qt is defined as the set of
those x ∈ D for which f(x) ≤ t.
The procedure above hinges on our ability to define the appropriate
points x(t) that satisfy the required condition. This is based on
considering the tangent to the surface of Qt. Note that the only
essential difference between D and Q is that the latter is defined
by an infinite family of defining linear inequalities, namely, one for
each hyperplane H that is tangent toQ. Keeping this perspective in
mind, let us apply the original problem definition to a point x ∈ Q.
If x lies in the interior of Q, then none of Q’s defining inequalities
holds with equality. Thus, as before, J(x) is empty for any x in
the interior of the domain Q. We therefore consider x that lies on
the boundary of Q. In this case the set J(x) is a singleton, the only
member of which is the inequality corresponding to the hyperplane
H that is tangent toQ and touches it at the point x. The equation of
the tangent hyperplane H can be written as
∑
νixi = 1, where the
vector (ν1, . . . , νn) is normal to H . Now condition (3) becomes
∀i νixi ≥ ei. (4)
When we sum over all i this becomes
∑
νixi ≥
∑
ei = 1. But
x lies on H , so that
∑
νixi = 1. It follows that all inequalities
in Eq. (4) hold with equality. But we also have, from the definition
of the bottlenecks, that
∑
rijxi = 1. Thus, the normal is simply
defined by the requirements vectors. Moreover, we can use this as
a condition on the gradients of the surfaces ofQt for successive t’s,
and follow a trajectory that leads to a solution on the boundary of
D. This is then the desired constructive proof: it both shows that a
solution exists, and provides a mechanism for finding it.
5.3 The Case N = 2
In this section, we give a complete proof of Theorem 1 for the case
N = 2 that is simpler than our general proof, and is perhaps more
intuitive. This includes an explanation of the relationship between
the normals to the surfaces and the requirements vectors. The ar-
gument for arbitrary N is given in the next subsection.
In the case N = 2, as noted above, the constraint (1) defines a
region in the first quadrant whose boundary is a piecewise linear
curve that satisfies the constraints in (1) with ≤ replaced by =.
Note that the slopes of the lines that define the boundary are neg-
ative, and as k increases from 0 to 1, the slopes of the lines that
intersect the vertical line x = k get more and more negative. This
follows from the fact that the interior is convex.
Let g be the piecewise linear curve that defines the boundary. We
can approximate g arbitrarily closely from below by a concave
twice-differentiable function f . (The function g is the boundary
of the region called D in the previous section; the function f is the
boundary of the regionQ.) The concavity of the curve f just means
that f ′′ < 0. As we said earlier, f “rounds off” the corners of g, as
shown in Fig. 4.
As we said in the previous section, we want to find a point (x∗1, x∗2)
on the curve f such that if ν1x1 + ν2x2 = 1 is the tangent to the
curve at (x∗1, x
∗
2), then ν1x∗1 = e1 and ν2x∗2 = e2. We show below
how to find such a point. We now argue that finding such a point
for each f approximating g suffices to prove the theorem in the
case that N = 2. First suppose that (x∗1, x∗2) is actually a point on
one of the lines that define g (as opposed to a point on f that arises
from rounding off a corner of the curve g). Suppose that the line is
defined by resource j, so that it has the form r1jx1 + r2jx2 = 1.
Obviously the tangent to f at the point (x∗1, x∗2) on the line is just
the line itself, so we have ν1 = r1j and ν2 = r2j . Thus, we will
have found x∗1 and x∗2 such that r1jx∗1 = e1 and r2jx∗2 = e2, which
means that (2) holds (and moreover, the same resource provides
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Figure 4: Rounding off the boundary of D.
justification for both users).
Next, suppose that (x∗1, x∗2) is not on one of the original lines,
but we can find such a point for all functions f approximating g.
Straightforward continuity arguments show that small changes to f
result in small changes to the point, so that as f gets closer to g, we
get a sequence of points that approach a point on g. Thus the limit
is a point on g. We actually get even more. What we really have
for each function f that approximates g is two pairs (x∗1, x∗2) and
(ν1, ν2), where (x∗1, x∗2) is a point on f , ν1x1+ν2x2 = 1 is the tan-
gent to f at (x∗1, x∗2), ν1x∗1 = e1, and ν2x∗2 = e2. As f approaches
g, we will get a sequence of such pairs of points. Let (xg1, x
g
2) and
(νg1 , ν
g
2 ) be the limit of this sequence of pairs of pairs. It is clearly
the case that (xg1, x
g
2) is a point on g, ν
g
1x
g
1 = e1, ν
g
2x
g
2 = e2, and
νg1x1 + ν
g
2x2 = 1. Now if (x
g
1, x
g
2) is in the interior of one of the
lines that make up the boundary of the region — let’s assume it is
the line associated with resource j — then, as the argument above
suggests, νg1 = r1j and ν
g
2 = r2j . Thus, resource j is a bottleneck,
and provides a justification for both users.
Now suppose that (xg1, x
g
2) is at the intersection of two lines, say,
representing resources j and j′. Thus, xg1r1j + x
g
2r2j = 1 and
xg1r1j′ +x
g
2r2j′ = 1, so both resources are bottlenecks at (x
g
1, x
g
2).
Moreover, we still have νg1x
g
1 = e1 and ν
g
2x
g
2 = e2. Finally, it
is clear that νgi must be a convex combination of rij and rij′ , for
i ∈ {1, 2}, since, for each approximation f to g, the tangent in the
region that we have “rounded off” is a convex combination of the
tangents of the lines that make up g that are being approximated.
It follows that each user i ∈ {1, 2} gets at least his entitlement on
one of resources j or j′; that is, either rijxgi ≥ ei or rij′x
g
i ≥ ei.
For if rijxgi < ei and rij′x
g
i < ei, then ν
g
i x
g
i < ei, and we have a
contradiction.
The fact that we can find such a point (x∗1, x∗2) on each f fol-
lows from another easy continuity argument. Consider the points
on the function f in the first quadrant. Suppose that f starts at
the Y -axis at some point (0, y′) and ends at the X-axis at some
point (x′, 0). Let the equation of the tangent of f at the point
x
⋄ = (x⋄1, x
⋄
2) be νx
⋄
· x = 1. Consider the term q(x⋄) =
(νx
⋄
1 x
⋄
1)/(ν
x
⋄
2 x
⋄
2) = −f
′(x⋄1)x
⋄
1/x
⋄
2 as x
⋄ goes from (0, y′) to
(x′, 0). As x⋄ approaches (0, y′) from the right, q(x⋄) approaches
0; as x⋄ approaches (x′, 0) from the left, q(x⋄) approaches ∞.
Since f ′ is continuous, q varies continuously in the first quadrant
between 0 and∞. Thus, at some point it must have value e1/e2. If
q(x∗) = e1/e2, then we must have νx
∗
1 x
∗
1/ν
x
∗
2 x
∗
2 = e1/e2. Since
we also have νx
∗
1 x
∗
1 + ν
x
∗
2 x
∗
2 = 1 and e1 + e2 = 1, it easily fol-
lows that we must have νx
∗
1 x
∗
1 = e1 and νx
∗
2 x
∗
2 = e2, as desired.
x2
x1
e
e =1.5
2
1
10
0
1
point corresponding
to ratio
0.6
0.9
Figure 5: Simple example of a point (x∗1, x∗2). Different points
correspond to different ratios e2
e1
, as indicated by the slopes of the
line segments.
This completes the proof in the case that N = 2.
We can actually say more in the case that N = 2. Since f is con-
cave, f ′ is decreasing, so −f ′ is increasing. It easily follows that
q is an increasing function. Thus, there is a unique point (x∗1, x∗2)
with the desired properties. It easily follows that, in the case of
two users, the solution to (1) and (2) is unique. Uniqueness has
an important consequence. In the problem definition, the bottle-
neck resources in (1) are not known in advance. In particular, it
might seem that different solutions may lead to different resources
becoming bottlenecks. Uniqueness guarantees that this is not the
case, and that the set of resources that will become bottlenecks is
uniquely defined by the problem parameters (that is, the entitle-
ments and request profiles). We remark that the uniqueness claim
does not hold in general for N > 2; see Section 5.5.
The example in Fig. 5 may help in gaining an intuition for the
derivation above. Consider a single limiting resource, where both
users request r1 = r2 = 23 of its capacity. The boundary line
representing the capacity limit of the resource has the equation
2
3
x1 +
2
3
x2 = 1. Different points along this line correspond to
different ratios of the users’ entitlements. For example, if they have
entitlements of 0.4 and 0.6, the point (0.6, 0.9) satisfies the equa-
tions 2
3
· 0.6 = 0.4 and 2
3
· 0.9 = 0.6, and indeed using these
values for x1 and x2 leads to sharing the resource in the desired
proportions. If the ratio of entitlements is such that e2
e1
> 2, then
user 2 is not requesting his full entitlement, and is eliminated from
consideration. He is given his full request, and user 1 gets the rest,
which is more than his entitlement (so they are both satisfied). This
is in fact an example of a solution based on a dummy resource. The
opposite happens if e2
e1
< 1
2
.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 1
We now prove Theorem 1 for arbitrary N .
Construction 1. To every allocationx in the interior of the domain
D, we assign a value
f(x) = −
m∑
j=1
log
(
1−
N∑
k=1
xkrkj
)
. (5)
Remark 1. The function f is positive in the interior ofD, diverging
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Figure 6: Illustration of level-sets of f from t = 0 to t =∞.
to infinity as x tends to the boundary of D.2
Remark 2. Clearly, there are other choices of f that satisfy these
desired properties. This choice seems like the simplest one for our
purposes.
Definition 1. To every number t > 0, there corresponds a level set
of f , namely,
Γt = {x ∈ D : f(x) = t},
Remark 3. This is an (N − 1)-dimensional hypersurface. (Fig. 6
illustrates this for N = 2.)
Definition 2. To every point x ∈ D, there corresponds a unique
unit vector ν(x) = (ν1(x), . . . , νN (x)), normal to the level set of
f at x.
The unit normal ν(x) is proportional to the gradient of f at x,
implying that
νi(x) = c˜
∂f
∂xi
(x) = c˜
m∑
j=1
rij
1−
∑N
k=1 xkrkj
, ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
(6)
where the normalization constant c˜ is chosen so as to guarantee that
ν is a unit vector, that is, ν21 + · · ·+ ν2N = 1.
Construction 2. We now construct a vector-valued function
x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN(t)), t ≥ 0,
satisfying the following properties:
1. x(t) lies on the level set Γt for all t ≥ 0 (and, in particular,
remains in D).
2. For all t > 0, there exists a t-dependent normalization factor
c(t), such that for every i = 1, . . . , N ,
xi(t) νi(x(t)) = c˜ c(t)ei. (7)
Remark 4. Note that since f(x(0)) = 0 it follows that x(0) = 0,
that is, the vector-valued function x(t) “starts” at the origin.
Remark 5. substituting (6) into (7) and summing over the index i
determines c˜ c(t). After simple algebraic manipulations, summing
the expressions (7) over i gives us
m∑
j=1
xi(t)rij − (
∑N
k=1 xk(t)rkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(t)rkj
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, ∀t > 0.
(8)
2Note that this function f is not the curve f of Section 5.3.
Intuitively, x(t) is a “trajectory” that takes us from the originx = 0
to a point on the boundary of D as t grows from 0 to ∞.
The formal proof now follows from the following sequence of three
lemmas, proved below. First, we show that a trajectory with the
required properties exists (Lemma 4). Given such a trajectory, we
show that a subsequence of this trajectory converges to a point on
the boundary of D (Lemma 2). Finally, this accumulation point is
shown to be a solution to our allocation problem (Lemma 3).
It is convenient to delay the question of whether there indeed exists
a trajectory x(t) satisfying the required properties, and consider
convergence first.
Lemma 2. Let 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · be a sequence tending to infin-
ity. Let x(t) be a vector-valued function as defined in Construction
2. Then, the sequence x(ti) has a subsequence that converges to
an allocation x∗ on the boundary of D.
PROOF. Consider what happens as t → ∞. Since x(t) ∈
Γt, it follows that x(t) approaches the boundary of D. However,
the function x(t) may not tend to a limit as t → ∞. Neverthe-
less, since D is a compact domain, x(t) has a convergent subse-
quence. That is, there exists an allocation x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗N) on
the boundary of D and a subsequence tn1 < tn2 < . . . such that
lim
k→∞
x(tnk) = x
∗.
The next lemma shows that this accumulation point is a solution to
the fair allocation problem.
Lemma 3. An allocation x∗ as resulting from Lemma 2 is a fair
allocation according to our definition.
PROOF. Since x∗ is on the boundary of D, it has a non-empty
set J(x∗) of bottleneck resources such that
x∗1r1j + · · ·+ x
∗
NrNj = 1 ∀j ∈ J(x
∗) 6= ∅.
We then rewrite (8) by splitting the resources j into bottleneck re-
sources and non-bottleneck resources, and setting t = tn:
∑
j 6∈J(x∗)
xi(tn)rij − (
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj
+
∑
j∈J(x∗)
xi(tn)rij − (
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj
= 0.
(9)
The two summations behave very differently as n→∞. For a non-
bottleneck resource j,
∑N
k=1 x
∗
krkj < 1, so the summation over
the non-bottleneck resources tends to a limit obtained by letting
x(tn)→ x
∗ term-by-term:
lim
n→∞
∑
j 6∈J(x∗)
xi(tn)rij − (
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj
=
∑
j 6∈J(x∗)
x∗i rij − (
∑N
k=1 x
∗
krkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 x
∗
krkj
.
(10)
For a bottleneck resource j, the denominator 1−
∑N
k=1 xkrkj tends
to zero as x→ x∗, so the limit exists only if the numerator vanishes
as well. But if it were the case that, for a given user i,
x∗i rij < ei for all j ∈ J(x∗),
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then
lim
n→∞
∑
j∈J(x∗)
xi(tn)rij − (
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj)ei
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(tn)rkj
= −∞.
This is a contradiction to the fact that, by (9), the limit should be
the negative of the right-hand side of (10). Hence we conclude that
x
∗ has the property that for all users i, there exists a bottleneck
resource j such that x∗i rij ≥ ei. Thus, x∗ is a fair allocation.
It remains to show that the trajectoryx(t) is indeed well-defined for
all system parameters ei and rij . This is handled by the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists a function x(t) with the properties speci-
fied in Construction 2.
PROOF. To prove this we show that we can find points satisfying
property 1 that also satisfy property 2. Since x(t) ∈ Γt, we have
f(x(t)) = t, that is,
−
m∑
j=1
log
(
1−
N∑
k=1
xk(t)rkj
)
= t. (11)
By (7),
m∑
j=1
xi(t)rij
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(t)rkj
= c(t)ei, ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (12)
Differentiating both equations with respect to t, we obtain a linear
system of equations for the derivative dx/dt. Differentiating (11),
we get ∑N
k=1
dxk
dt
rkj
1−
∑N
k=1 xk(t)rkj
= 1.
Differentiating (12), we get
m∑
j=1
dxi
dt
rij
1−
∑N
k=1 xkrkj
+
m∑
j=1
xirij
∑N
k=1
dxk
dt
rkj
(1−
∑N
k=1 xkrkj)
2
=
dc
dt
ei. (13)
Observe that, without loss of generality, we can set dc/dt = 1,
compute the resulting vector of derivatives dx/dt, and then multi-
ply it by a constant for the normalization condition to hold. Thus, it
remains only to show that (13) has a unique solution when dc/dt =
1. To do so, we define an x-dependent matrix with entries
bij =
rij
1−
∑N
k=1 xkrkj
, i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,m .
These entries are non-negative for x ∈ D. We now rewrite (13) in
a more compact form,
m∑
k=1
dxk
dt
(
m∑
j=1
bijδik +
N∑
j=1
xibijbkj
)
= ei.
The term inside the brackets is the (k, i) entry of a symmetric
positive-definite N × N matrix, which immediately implies that
there exists a unique solution dx/dt. Moreover, since the depen-
dence of dx/dt on x is continuous, the existence and uniqueness
of x(t) follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Ordinary Differ-
ential Equations [9]. (More precisely, the fundamental theorem of
ODEs guarantees only the existence and uniqueness of a solution
for some small t; global existence follows from the boundedness of
the domain D.)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We note that our proof that a fair allocation exists is almost con-
structive. The trajectories x(t) can easily be computed numerically
using standard ODE integrators (for example, Matlab’s ode45 func-
tion). If x(t) is found to tend to a limit for large t, then this limit is
a fair allocation. The only reservation is that numerical integration
only provides approximate solutions (however, with a controllable
error), and can only be carried out over a finite t interval.
5.5 Uniqueness of the Solution
As we mentioned in Section 5.3, unlike the case N = 2, in the
general case the solution is not unique. This is easily seen from
the following counterexample. Assume N = 3 and m = 2, with
r1 = (1, 1), r2 = (0, 1), r3 = (1, 0), and e = (0.5, 0.3, 0.2).
This has the the family of solutions x = (z, 1 − z, 1 − z) for z
that satisfies 0.5 ≤ z ≤ 0.7, where in all these solutions both
resources are bottlenecks. Note that this does not contradict the fact
that our solution method finds a unique trajectory. This trajectory
corresponds to the choice of the function f in (5). Other choices,
e.g. by adding different weighting factors to each term in the sum,
could lead to other trajectories and other solutions.
There also exist cases where different solutions depend on different
bottlenecks. Consider the following example, with four users and
four resources (N = m = 4). Assume all users have the same enti-
tlements, that is ei = 0.25 for i = 1, . . . , 4. Arrange the users and
resources in a circle, and make each user request the full capacity
of its resource and those of its neighbors. Thus the requirements
matrix becomes
r =


1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1


This instance is completely symmetric, and the obvious solution is
a symmetric allocation where xi = 13 for i = 1, . . . , 4. In this so-
lution, all 4 resources are bottlenecks, and all users get more than
their entitlements on all the resources they use. But there are 6 ad-
ditional solutions. Pick any two users i and j, and set xi = xj =
0.25. Let k and l be the other two users, and set xk = xl = 0.375.
Now two resources are bottlenecks (0.25 + 0.375 + 0.375 = 1)
but the other two are not (0.25 + 0.25 + 0.375 = 0.875). Which
resources become bottlenecks depends on the choice of k and l.
If they are adjacent, then resources k and l are the bottlenecks. If
they are opposite each other, then resources i and j are the bottle-
necks. In any case, every user gets his entitlement on at least one
bottleneck resource. This demonstrates that the set of bottleneck
resources is not unique.
The finding that there may be multiple solutions opens the issue of
selecting among them. In particular, once one accepts our defini-
tion of fairness and finds a set of fair solutions that satisfy all users,
it becomes possible to use the remaining freedom to select the spe-
cific solution that optimizes some other metric. For example, we
can decide that the secondary goal is to maximize system utiliza-
tion; in the above example, this will lead to preferring the sym-
metric solution where all resources are bottlenecks over the other
solutions where only two are bottlenecks. This provides an inter-
esting way to combine user-centric metrics (the entitlements) with
system-centric metrics (resource utilization).
Of course, making such optimizations hinges on our ability to iden-
tify and characterize all the possible solutions. At present how to
do this remains an open question.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, our main contribution is the definition of what it
means to make a fair allocation of multiple continuously-divisible
resources when users have different requirements for the resources,
and a proof that such an allocation is in fact achievable. The defini-
tion is based on the identification of bottleneck resources, and the
allocation guarantees that each user either receives all he wishes
for, or else gets at least his entitlement on some bottleneck resource.
The proof is constructive in the sense that it describes a method to
find such a solution numerically. The method has in fact been pro-
grammed in Matlab, and was used in our exploration of various
scenarios. While this method has seemed efficient in practice, one
obvious open question is whether we can get a method that is poly-
nomial in N and m.
Note that, in the context of on-line scheduling, we may not need
to find an explicit solution in advance. Consider for example the
RSVT scheduler described by Ben-Nun et al. [5]. This is a fair
share scheduler that bases scheduling decisions on the gap between
what each user has consumed and what he was entitled to receive.
To do so, the system keeps a global view of resource usage by the
different users. If there is only one bottleneck in the system, this
would be applied to the bottleneck resource. The question is what
to do if there are multiple bottlenecks. Our results indicate that
the correct course of action is to prioritize each process based on
the minimal gap on any of the bottleneck devices, because this is
where it is easiest to close the gap and achieve the desired entitle-
ment. Once the user achieves his target allocation on any of the
bottleneck devices, he should not be promoted further. This con-
tradicts the intuition that when a user uses multiple resources, his
global priority should be determined by the one where he is farthest
behind.
It should also be noted that our proposal pertains to the policy level,
and only suggests the considerations that should be applied when
fair allocations are desired. It can in principle be used with any
available mechanism for actually controlling resource allocation,
for example, resource containers [3].
A possible direction for additional work is to extend the model. In
particular, an interesting question is what to do when the relative
usage of different resources is not linearly related. In such a case,
we need to replace the user-based factors xi by specific factors xij
for each user and resource. This also opens the door for a game
where users adjust their usage profile in response to system allo-
cations — for example, substituting computation for bandwidth by
using compression — and the use of machine learning to predict
performance and make optimizations [6]. Finally, we might con-
sider approaches where users have specific utilities associated with
each resource.
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